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The subject of the article is the process of forming ideas about the world as reality, which 
is most accurately described by the word “invention”. The author, relying on classical texts 
in this respect (E. Husserl, M. Heidegger) and modern studies (A. Makushinsky, J.-F. Kurtin) 
substantiates the position according to which the idea of reality is not a cultural invariant. The 
notion that reality has always existed, and thanks to scientific reason has been most adequately 
reflected, understood and described, is a significant modernization. This has been evidenced 
by both the etymology of the concepts of “reality” and “reality”, which first appeared only in 
scholasticism (D. Scotus, M. Eckhart), and the process of their content filling, which is inex-
tricably linked with the formation of scientific rationality. The article shows that both the sci-
entific mind and the integral image of the world created by it, which we call reality, genetically 
date back to the Christian value-semantic universe. Initially, it was within the framework of 
the discourse of natural theology that the image of the autonomous world has been conceptu-
alized, developing according to the universal principles established by God. In the first scien-
tific programs (R. Descartes, G. Galilei, I. Newton), these ideas were continued, as a result of 
which the world began to be understood as an immanent reality that is subject to the laws of 
nature. The new ontological beliefs received the ultimate philosophical foundation in the phi-
losophy of Immanuel Kant, to whom the phenomenal world exhausts the reality available to 
man. Accordingly, the world turns into a one-dimensional detranscendentalized reality. This 
methodological approach allows the author to make the following conclusions: 1) the image of 
world “reality” is a rather modern “invention”, which was unknown in previous eras; 2) at the 
same time, it is genetically connected with the Christian semantic universe, outside of which 
it could not appear; 3) the world in it is understood as a one-dimensional immanent reality.
Keywords: reality, existence, world, scientific reasoning, Christianity, natural theology, mo-
dernity.
Back in the late 90s, Jürgen Habermas drew attention to recent transformations in the 
understanding of reality, which he associated with the linguistic turn. The German phi-
losopher showed that the relativization of ontological beliefs inevitably leads to the recog-
nition of the relativity of ethical imperatives that threaten the stable functioning of society. 
Habermas writes that in order to overcome this state, a concept of truth is needed, which 
“connects the result of successful justification with something in the objective world” [1, 
p. 42]. In this connection, he proposes to return from the historicity and locality of Hegel’s 
conceptualism to Kantian universalism, that is, in a sense, to go in the opposite direction 
along the path of detranscendentalization of existence.
Recently, the debate about the nature of reality has flared up with renewed vigor. We 
can say that it was initiated by the concept of “new realism” proposed by Maurizio Ferraris 
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and supported by Markus Gabriel, Evandro Agazzi, Rom Harré and others. In the Rus-
sian-language discourse, similar views are defended by such scholars as David Dubrovsky, 
Vladislav Lektorsky, and Elena Mamchur. A consolidating position in this regard can be 
considered the idea of Ferraris, who wrote that according to realism, natural objects exist 
regardless of the ways in which we cognize them [2].
Gloria Origgi criticized this position, formulating the delusions of the new realism in 
five points. She writes that new realism is possible only when ignoring the achievements 
of philosophy of recent decades, according to which natural facts are always social facts: 
“… all those things that our ancestors thought of as natural are now culturalized, they have 
become social facts” [3]. From the Russian-speaking studies in this regard, one should 
acknowledge Ilya Kasavin who presented the social determinism of ontological attitudes 
and Andrey Smirnov, who connected statements about the nature of what exists with the 
logic of meaning. Separately, it is necessary to mention the last monograph of Habermas, 
which traces the connection between modern ways of conceptualizing beings, the origins 
of which are associated with German classical idealism, and Christian ontology [4].
Accordingly, the “archaeology” of the content of the notion “reality”, which is under-
taken within the framework of this article, is further developing this discussion and allows 
us to clarify the status of our judgments about reality and check their historical invariance.
In his famous work “The Age of the World Picture”, Heidegger convincingly showed 
the historicity of the worlds that appear to man. He connects modern times with a unique 
situation when the world appears in front of a person in the form of a picture. “Hence 
world picture,” Heidegger writes, “when understood essentially, does not mean a picture 
of the world but the world conceived and grasped as picture. What it is, in its entirety, is 
now taken in such a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it is 
set up by man, who represents and sets forth” [5, p. 129–130].
According to the German philosopher, the truth of being, understood as certainty, 
determines such a world where to be now means to be a part of the picture of the world, 
which is understood as a picture. Naturally, this is fundamentally different from the me-
dieval “worldview”, where to be means to be a part of the hierarchy of beings, or from the 
ancient one, where to be is the essence of being an element of the cosmic order. It is obvi-
ous that these metamorphoses concern not only special issues of ontology, but affect the 
entire cultural image. Accordingly, as Heidegger claimed, there has never been anything 
like the ancient or medieval picture of the world, the world presented in the form of a 
picture characterizes exclusively the age of modernity.
Following Heidegger, the same can be said about reality: what seems to us to be an 
invariant characteristic of any cultural universe turns out to be quite a recent and unique 
cultural concept. Moreover, such ontological concepts are: 1)  historically changeable; 
2) assume a unique, characteristic only of a given historical era, form of rationality and 
the type of objectivity associated with it; 3) legitimize relevant behavioral strategies and 
public goals. The integral image of the world, which we call reality, is characteristic only 
for our age. Therefore, the question of its genealogy becomes logical. Taking into account 
the position the idea of “reality” occupies in the modern worldview, the limit of this ques-
tion becomes self-evident. Thus, the purpose of this study is to analyze the formation of 
the of the world picture, understood as reality.
The first thing that draws attention to itself is the etymology of the very concept of 
“reality”. It is really not as archaic as it might seem and begins its history from the time of 
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scholasticism. Word use in the modern sense has even less history and may be associated 
with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. John Kurtin, the author of the article “ ‘Reality’ in 
the European Dictionary of Philosophy”, writes that the term “realitas” (reality) is a neolo-
gism of Duns Scotus (possibly Henry of Ghent), derived from res (thing), and inscribed in 
his doctrine of formalities to originally denote the essence and characteristics of a certain 
thing.
The conceptualism of Scotus laid the foundation for the understanding and use of 
the concept of “reality” for the entire European philosophy up to Kant. Reality for him is 
devoid of independent existence, it is always the reality of a thing, while several realities 
are simultaneously present in a thing. Accordingly, “reality” or “formalities” make it pos-
sible to distinguish one thing from another, “such a distinction that is neither actual nor 
potential, but only virtual or exclusively formal” [6, p. 30].
This understanding has been classical for many centuries; a good example of this is 
the dictionary of Étienne Chauvin, published at the very end of the 17th century. In it, the 
genealogy of the concept of “reality” is raised to the Scotus’ tradition, and the meaning is 
associated with the characteristic of the thing [6, p. 33].
Modern usage of the concept of “reality” begins with the first Kantian Critique. De-
spite the fact that the German philosopher uses this term in several meanings, including 
in the scholastic understanding: following the tradition of Scotus, he associates “reality” 
to the second group of the table of categories, to quality, not modality. Nevertheless, it was 
Kant who, using additional adjectives (objective reality, empirical reality, subjective real-
ity), initiated the understanding of reality as something external in relation to the subject 
of knowledge [6, p. 39].
The situation is almost identical with the closest synonym for “reality” — “existence”. 
The term “existence” was invented during the late Middle Ages (in German Christian 
mysticism) as a designation for the actual (existing) state of some potency. Here, we are 
referring to the reality of something. In the meaning of “the totality of everything that 
exists”, “that which is”, “existence” is used starting only from the end of the 18th century. 
Alexey Makushinsky, who convincingly showed the historicity of reality as an image of the 
world, writes that the adjective wirklich (real) first occurs in the mystical literature of the 
13th century, it is formed from the verb wirken (to do, act). Directly, the noun wirklichkeit 
was introduced by Meister Eckhart as a translation of the Latin term actualitas, opposite to 
potentialitas: thus, the opposition of actual existence to the possible is defined. “And only 
in the 18th century,” Makushinsky writes, “the concept of “wirklich”, delimiting itself from 
“wirksam” (“potent”), acquires the meaning of “real”; the noun Wirklichkeit preserves the 
value of the property (“the existence of something”), that is, is an abstract noun accord-
ing to the meaning of the adjective “real”. Even more recent is the use of the term in the 
meaning of “the sum of all that is real,” “the totality of everything available to experience 
and perception” [7, p. 270].
Makushinsky shows that the image of the world “existence” is relevant only to the 
worldview of a man of modernity: previous epochs “knew no existence” [7, p. 271]. Ac-
cordingly, the researcher concludes: “The matter, in other words, is not at all as if in the 
middle (approximately) of the 19th century there was a turn to the already actual existence, 
which, allegedly, was expressed in realism, but realism itself therefore became possible 
because the existence (that is, the idea of existence is the same thing) has finally won a 
dominant position” [7, p. 269].
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Thus, an etymological analysis of the concepts of “reality” and “existence” shows, 
on the one hand, the historicity of their modern word use, and at the same time the par-
ticularity of their referents. On the other hand, it reveals the Christian origins of their 
genealogy.
This conclusion compels us to pose the following question. If our ideas about the 
world are historical and at the same time culturally loaded, how did that integral image 
of the world, which we call “reality”, form? The answer to this question may consist of 
several parts, which in one way or another go back to the fact of the genetic dependence 
of new science on Western Christian theology. In the wording of Piama Gaidenko, this 
fact is expressed in the following thesis: “Today, the point of view has become widespread, 
according to which it is the Christian attitude to nature as to the object of human domi-
nation that underlies both the modern European science and the modern technogenic 
civilization that has grown on its basis” [8, p. 162].
In this process of emerging scientific rationality, there are several key factors to con-
sider. Firstly, the formation of an intellectual discourse in which creation (nature) be-
comes a special subject. Secondly, the substantiation of new ideas about the autonomous 
world, which is developing according to its own internal laws. Thirdly, the rethinking of 
ancient ideas about the world, as a result of which it is endowed with new attributes. And 
finally, fourthly, which is fundamental for the first three points, there is a change in the 
ancient metaphysical premises of thinking and cultural experience, Christian ones, which 
are enshrined in the form of general church dogmas.
Ernst Cassirer, while analyzing his contemporary philosophy of science, wrote: 
“…only with the construction of a certain symbolic world, the world of physical “rea- 
lity” becomes accessible” [9, p. 325]. The subject appears only within a certain theoretical 
discourse. Mikhail Petrov points out that theology, which became the prototype for the 
science of modern age, was such a discourse in which the subject “nature” was initially 
conceptualized. Already by the XII century, (Alain de Lille) the expression “Book of Na-
ture” was established, and Raymond of Sabunde in “Natural Theology” writes that God 
gave people two books: The Bible and the Book of Nature. Both books have one author and 
by studying them, you can better understand the author’s intention. Nature, as created by 
a perfect God, becomes the bearer of permanent and final truths (which essentially dis-
tinguishes such a worldview position from antiquity), and its knowledge is a godly deed. 
“First, by theologians…, — Petrov writes, — and later by scientists… “nature” is under-
stood as a book — a bearer of the text, and since The Bible and the “Book of Nature” have 
the same author, “nature” is understood as a sacred text that carries the ultimate truth, 
equal to The Bible, and possibly a higher dignity” [10, p. 254]. The need to study nature 
follows from the very doctrine of creation. If the world is created, and man is its crown, 
then the world must be cognizable so that man can exercise control over this world.
Over time, such a theoretical attitude leads to transformations in the very structure 
of knowledge, as a result of which a separate discipline stands out, the subject of which 
is nature, and its study becomes an alternative path to God. In this regard, Petrov notes: 
We find the beginning of this process in the shifts in the internal division of theology. The 
most dogmatized part of it, i. e., what should become an array of untouchable and finally resolved 
issues, an array of available disciplinary knowledge, is first isolated into the “divine” (theologia 
divina), and then into the theology of “revelation” (theologia revelata), while the objective 
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component makes a sliding movement from the theology of the world (theologia mundana) to 
“natural” theology (theologia naturalis). The division of unified theology into the theology of 
revelation and natural theology becomes stable… [10, p. 252] 
It was within the framework of the latter that “nature” was conceptualized, and na- 
tural theology itself, over time, “mutated” into the science of modern times. In this re-
spect, one can solidarize with the position of Anatoly Akhutin, who wrote: “The Christian 
worldview in general and scholastic peripatetics in particular is a cultural, conceptual and 
scientific environment in which scientific reason was being born and formed” [11, p. 24].
Thus, in scholasticism, the discourse itself was invented, in which, some time later, it 
became possible to look at creation as both nature and reality.
Such a view made it possible to see an autonomous world developing according to 
its own internal laws. And for the first time it was done by theologians, not scientists. Of 
course, creation itself in Christian theology was not conceived of as having an independ-
ent being, without a connection to its Creator. But once having received existence from 
Him, it continues to develop according to the laws, which were communicated by God. In 
this regard, the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas can be considered as generalizing, about 
which Étienne Gilson wrote when analyzing it: 
In communicating existence to all creatures, God simultaneously gives them form, 
movement and ability to act; but from that moment on, all these properties belong to creatures, 
and they perform their actions themselves. The essence of the lowest level acts and gives rise 
to a certain effect, although it generates it due to all reasons higher than itself, to which it itself 
is submitted and which influence is transmitted from one cause to another until this influence 
reaches it. At the beginning of this sequence is God, who is the universal and immediate cause 
of all produced effects and all the unfolding activity; in the end God is the natural body, the 
immediate cause of the implementation of its own action, although this action is performed only 
thanks to the acting causality imparted to the body by God [12, p. 232].
In the above quote, it is not difficult to see the prototype of the mechanistic picture of 
the world, which is characteristic for the first scientific programs: God launches the world 
machine, which further develops autonomously according to the laws embedded in it. 
The subject of natural-scientific reason — an independent world, which is submitted to its 
immanent laws, was originally constructed within the framework of Christian theology.
Vyacheslav Stepin has very accurately described the worldview status of science for 
the modern era, where “it independently forms the dominant worldview images, and the 
scientific picture of the world claims a special position in the processes of people’s world-
view orientation” [13, p. 19]. In turn, Gaidenko singles out a number of transformations 
that led to the formation of the scientific mind and the physical image of the world as its 
subject. She writes about the substantiation of the possibility of the infinity of the world, 
the revision of the understanding of the natural and artificial, the supralunary and sublu-
nary worlds, the relationship between mathematics and physics, the expulsion of the final 
cause from nature. According to Gaidenko, all these changes have either occurred within 
the framework of the Christian worldview, or were prepared by it [8].
As it is known, Aristotle, and after him ancient and practically all medieval sci-
ence, have proceeded from the finiteness of space and the heterogeneity of its constituent 
places. This has caused a different understanding of the nature of the world and move-
ment from the modern one. The need to revise these ideas was clearly manifested when 
it became necessary to reconcile the finite space with the infinite omnipotence of God. 
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Thomas Bradwardine wrote: “God is necessary everywhere, not only in the world and in 
all its parts, but also outside the world in a place or in an imaginary infinite emptiness… 
Whence it clearly follows that emptiness can exist without a body, but in no way can there 
be emptiness without God” (cit. according to [8, p. 145–146]. If God is infinitely omnipo-
tent, then nothing can limit him, “he is present not only in the world, but also where there 
is no world, in an infinite void”. The logic of this argument was almost identically repro-
duced in their time by Giordano Bruno, Thomas More and Isaac Newton, who wrote: 
“… the creator and ruler of all things does not come anywhere and ever (but always and 
everywhere)” [14, p. 660].
At the same time, the purposeful reason is progressively expelled from the world: in 
order for God to realize his plan, effective reasons are needed, which should be sought. 
Jean Buridan has refused to accept the final cause as an explanation of the phenomena oc-
curring in nature. Fruits on trees cannot be the cause of leaves and flowers, nor can chicks 
be the cause of nesting for birds: the effect cannot be the cause. According to Annelize 
Meyer, Buridan wants to explain the universe only with the help of acting reasons. The 
premise, in the form of the absence of a final cause in the world, is fundamental for the 
constitution of the world within the framework of physical theory. In Critique of Scientific 
Reason, Kurt Huebner proved that modern physics and science as a whole can exist only 
in a theoretical space, which lacks the idea of a final cause.
Buridan has also made significant contributions to the physics of impetus, which 
formed the basis of the momentum theory. In Aristotelian physics, the continuation of the 
movement of a body, which is no longer affected by the engine, was explained by the fact that 
the engine acts not only on the body, but also on the environment in which it moves, thereby 
this environment, for example, air for the thrown body, continues moving it for some time. 
Even John Philoponus suggested that the thrower imparts some immaterial driving force 
(later called virtus impressa, or virtus motiva, impetus impressus, impetus) on the thrown 
object. Buridan, in this regard, wrote: “…In a stone or other thrown body, there is something 
imprinted, representing the motive force (virtus motiva) of the body. This is obviously bet-
ter than resorting to the assertion that the air continues to move the thrown body. It seems 
that the air is rather resisting. Therefore, I suppose, it should be said that the engine, when 
moving the body, imprints (imprimit) some impetus in it… And the faster the engine moves 
the mobile, the stronger the impetus it imprints on it. It is through this impetus we move the 
stone after the thrower stops moving” (cit. according to [8, p. 231]).
Researchers associate the law of inertia with the idea of the continuous creation of the 
world by God. Bede the Venerable formulated four senses of the concept of “divine crea-
tion”, the fourth of which says that the “seeds and primary causes of things”, which have 
been created, continue to develop in a natural way and now, the activity of the Creator is 
still continuing: “God still feeds birds and clothes lilies”. This understanding of creation 
allowed the authors of the first scientific programs to see in it an autonomous world with 
laws that are immanent to it. Gaidenko notes “In what Bede characterized as the fourth 
sense of the idea of creation, namely the continual preservation of the created, Descartes 
sees the source of the law of conservation; from the fact that God acts “with the greatest 
constancy and immutability”, the philosopher deduces the fundamental law of nature, that 
is the law of inertia” [8, p. 158].
Thus, in scholasticism, conceptual foundations were prepared, which eventually be-
came the starting point for the first scientific programs. In this regard, one should agree 
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with Alexander Belokobylsky, who writes that “in scholastic metaphysics а  “rational 
“Doppelganger” of the mythical picture of the world has been formed. This Doppelganger, 
opening new horizons in regard to the knowledge of God within the framework of “natu-
ral theology”, was guided by the rationalized concepts of “God” (as an ultimate rational 
concept), which unfolds its activity in “infinite space”, launches the “world machine” with 
its “first impulse” (giving all things eternal “impetuses” — the Divine presence, which is 
imprinted in things) and is present in the created world as its inner foundation and prin-
ciple” [15, p. 111].
At the same time, scholars emphasize that science, as a continuation of natural theo- 
logy, became possible due to the dominance of Christian dogmatics. Petrov points to 
the Trinity doctrine as a factor in the formation of scientific reasoning. Gaidenko speaks 
about the doctrine of creation as a prerequisite for the formation of a modern understand-
ing of nature and the doctrine of the Incarnation, as a reason for removing the impass-
able difference between the supralunary and sublunary worlds, and as a consequence of 
the mathematization of physics. Alexandre Kojève connects the formation of scientific 
rationality exclusively with the doctrine of the Incarnation. He consistently defends the 
exclusively Christian origin of science and finds its ultimate sense in the incarnation of 
Christ. Thanks to this, the impenetrable barrier between the transcendental world and the 
immanent was removed, the “sky” was lowered to earth, and it became possible to study 
the physical world by using mathematical methodology, which was previously relevant to 
the supralunary world.
“Indeed,” Kojève writes, “what is the Incarnation, if not the possibility for the eternal 
God to really, without losing his absolute perfection, be present in the temporal world 
where we ourselves live? But if the presence in the perceived world does not destroy this 
perfection, then the world itself is perfect (either it was or will be), in any case, to some 
extent (which, however, no one bothers to establish with accuracy). If, as believing Chris-
tians assert, the earthly (human) body can “at the same time” be the body of the God, 
thus, the divine body, and if, as the ancient Greeks thought, the divine (heavenly) bodies 
correctly reflect the eternal connections between mathematical entities, then nothing pre-
vents from finding these connections in this world, as well as in heaven” [16]. If the earthly 
body can be divine, then the methodology that has previously corresponded only to di-
vine bodies is equally applicable to it. Here, not only does mathematical physics take its 
origin, and mechanics becomes a part of physics, but there is also the implicitly presented 
thought of a homogeneous infinite space, which, as a result of several intellectual moves, 
can be thought of as absolutely immanent.
Concurrently, if we thoroughly think over the idea of the dogmatic foundations of 
science, it should be recognized that it was the first three confessions of Faith1, in which 
these dogmas were enshrined, that made modern science possible.
Thus, summarizing the above, it should be noted that: 1) in the depths of scholasti-
cism, the discourse of natural theology arose, in which “nature” was initially conceptual-
1 1. I believe in one God, the Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth and of all things visible and 
invisible.
2. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Only Begotten Son of God, born of the Father before all ages. God 
from God, Light from Light, true God from true God, begotten, not made, consubstantial with the Father; 
through him all things were made.
3. For us men and for our salvation he came down from heaven: by the power of the Holy Spirit he 
became incarnate from the Virgin Mary, and was made man.
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ized; 2) the world in this discourse was interpreted as autonomous and developing accord-
ing to the principles established by God; 3) Christian doctrines acted as metaphysical pre-
conditions for Christian reasoning, which led to a revision of the established ancient ideas 
about the world and reasoning, and, ultimately, the emergence of the science of modern 
times. Accordingly, it should be emphasized that the constitutive characteristics of both 
the natural-scientific mind and the world created by it were initially thematic within the 
framework of the Christian semantic universe and could not appear outside of it.
In the first scientific programs, ideas, which were originally formulated in scholasti-
cism, received a new, somewhat unexpected development. The end result of this was a 
one-dimensional detranscendentalized world, which made it possible to look at it like a 
picture.
Heidegger associated the appearance of the world with the philosophy of Descartes. 
Specialists in the field of philosophy and history of science supplement this list with the 
names of Copernicus, Bruno, Galilei, Newton, etc. It was stated in their works that: 1) the 
picture of the world was constructed, in which the world appeared as an endless, homoge-
neous, material, which is developing according to its immanent, eternal laws, the integral 
image of which we today call reality; 2) a special intellectual attitude that is relevant to this 
subject is substantiated, the extreme form of which is naturalism. At one time Edmund 
Husserl, showing the nature of naturalism, gave it a very capacious characteristic: “Natu-
ralism is a phenomenon that arose as a result of the discovery of nature — nature in the 
sense of the unity of spatio-temporal state according to the exact laws of nature… So, the 
naturalist, to whom we now will specially turn to, sees nothing at all except nature, and 
above all physical nature. Everything that exists is either itself physical, i. e., refers to the 
connection imbued with the unity of the physical nature, or, perhaps, psychically, but in 
this case it turns out to be simply dependent on the physical variable, at best a secondary 
‘parallel accompanying fact’ ” [17, p. 133]. Husserl himself connected the appearance of the 
scientific picture of the world with Galileo and his idea of the mathematization of nature.
Husserl also emphasized the historicity of nature, showing that it is the result of a 
specific theoretical attitude of the mind. In turn, Akhutin convincingly showed that the 
“ ‘nature’ of the ancient Greek thinker and the “nature” of a theoretical physicist of the 17th 
century are not just different understandings of the same subject or different attitudes to-
wards it. We are talking about completely different subjects” [11, p. 7]. At the same time, as 
it has been shown that this subject itself was initially constituted in theological discourse, 
the other being was the science of modern times.
Indeed, the language, the problems, and the tone of the first scientific programs reveal 
more of their closeness to theological discourse than to the modern scientific one. There-
fore, Nicolaus Copernicus, in the Preface to On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, 
dedicated to the then acting Pope Paul III, writes: “…When I had meditated upon this lack 
of certitude in the traditional mathematics concerning the composition of movements of 
the spheres of the world, I began to be annoyed that the philosophers, who in other re-
spects had made a very careful scrutiny of the least details of the world, had discovered no 
sure scheme for the movements of the machinery of the world, which has been built for 
us by the Best and Most Orderly Workman of all…” [18, p. 13] In turn, Descartes on the 
essence of the laws of nature wrote: “The mathematical truths which you call eternal have 
been laid by God and depend on Him entirely no less than the rest of His creatures… It is 
God who has laid down these laws in nature just as a king lays down laws in his kingdom” 
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[19, p. 588]. Newton considered the rationality of the structure of the universe discovered 
by him indisputable evidence of the existence of its (the universe’s) intelligent Creator: 
“…by the help of these Principles, all material Things seem to have been composed of 
the hard and solid Particles above-mention’d, variously associated in the first Creation 
by the Counsel of an intelligent Agent. For it became him who created them to set them 
in order. And if he did so, it’s unphilosophical to seek for any other Origin of the World, 
or to pretend that it might arise out of Chaos by the mere Laws of Nature” (cit. according 
to [20, p. 218]). One can find numerous examples, however, the main thing that becomes 
obvious here is that Copernicus, Descartes, Newton and others solve, by and large, theo-
logical problems, in theological language with full reverence for the sacred center of this 
discourse to God. They tried not to destroy or overcome theology, but to strengthen and 
substantiate it.
And it is in this theoretical semantic space the idea of an infinite, homogeneous, 
material world, which has gradually absorbed the attributes of God and became reality by 
definition, is formed. Alexandre Koyré conducted an excellent analysis of the process of 
transformation of the ancient enclosed space into the endless universe of modern science. 
He singled out the figures of Giordano Bruno, Henry More, Isaac Newton, Samuel Clarke, 
Gottfried Leibniz and others. Bruno, in particular, substantiates the infinity of space, us-
ing, by and large, the scholastic argument about the infinite omnipotence of God: “Thus 
is the excellence of God magnified and the greatness of His kingdom made manifest; He 
is glorified not in one, but in countless suns; not in a single earth, a single world, but in a 
thousand thousand, I say in an infinity of worlds” [21, p. 338].
Henry More makes the infinite space something sacred, giving divine attributes to 
it: the only, simple, immovable, eternal, independent, existing in itself, necessary, incom-
prehensible, all-existent, incorporeal, which is a pure act, etc. [20, p. 148]. Isaac Newton 
wrote about the infinite space as the Sensory of God, through which He perceives things.
The creation of the new image of the world also presupposed a rethinking of the 
understanding of matter. Galilei played a key role in this regard, showing the possibility 
of applying mathematical (geometric), models to changeable and unstable matter, which 
assumes constancy. As a result, the age-old concept of the fluidity of matter, emanating 
from Plato’s philosophy, was revised and an attribute that was previously characteristic of 
God — immutability, was given to it: “Since I assume that matter is immutable, that is, it 
constantly remains the same, it is clear that such an eternal and necessary property may 
well be the basis for purely mathematical reasoning” [22, p. 118]. Gaidenko writes that as 
a result of this fundamental transformation, the matter became equal to itself, unchang-
ing, self-identical, and acquired attributes that Plato attributed to ideas, and Aristotle to 
the form. A similar analogy can be recorded in regards to the transformation of the un-
derstanding of reality: scholastic thought linked reality with a thing, thingness, and over 
time, physical reality became synonymous with being as a whole. For the ancient mind, 
on the contrary, things have the smallest being, which practically comes to naught in the 
case of matter, about which Plato says “becomes and perishes and is never really existent” 
(Timaeus, 28a).
It has been justified that this material world itself is governed by eternal and imma-
nent principles — the laws of nature. However, their divine origin among the first scien-
tists does not raise any doubts. As noted above, Descartes attributes their authorship to 
Divine Providence. This point of view is also shared by the creator of modern physics, 
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Isaac Newton, whose thoughts, in the Preface to Mathematical Principles of Natural Phi-
losophy, were summed up by his student, apologist and publisher Roger Cotes: “…the 
world, distinguished by the most beautiful forms and variety of movements, could not 
have happened otherwise than by the free will of all predetermining and governing deity. 
From this source flowed all those properties that we call the laws of nature, in which a lot 
of the greatest wisdom is manifested, but there are no signs of necessity” [14, p. 19–20].
Though, in this almost orthodox rational activity, the world became more and more 
autonomized, matter became its universal substance. God was further removed from 
control of the world, remaining present in it in the form of the First Impulse, the role of 
which in the modern physical picture of the world is just as successfully performed by 
the Big Bang, and the once divine principles of the world management became the laws 
of nature, which is immanent to it. The world turned into a detranscendentalized object 
that is open for conquest by the subject. As Peter Berger once very aptly noted: “A sky 
empty of angels becomes open to the intervention of the astronomer and, eventually, of 
the astronaut” [23, p. 132].
As time went by, this infinite material world, which has inherited the attributes of 
God, needed His help less and less, and Laplace already proposed to abandon this “hy-
pothesis.” We can say that we are talking about those general cultural transformations that, 
after a little more than half a century, Friedrich Nietzsche would diagnose as the death 
of God. Koyré summed up this process in the following words: “The infinite Universe of 
the New Cosmology, infinite in Duration as well as in Extension, in which eternal matter 
in accordance with eternal and necessary laws moves endlessly and aimlessly in eternal 
space, inherited all the ontological attributes of Divinity. Yet only those — all the others 
the departed God took away with Him” [20, p. 276].
The new ontological concepts received the ultimate philosophical foundation in the 
work of Immanuel Kant. Although, as indicated, the author of the Critique of Pure Reason 
refers reality to the second group of the table of categories, to Quality, adhering by and large 
to the scholastic tradition. Furthermore, he redefines the concept of “reality”, using it in a 
modern sense. He writes about reality as an objective importance [24, p. 135], about the 
empirical reality of space and time [24, p. 135, 141], and about objective reality [24, p. 259].
In general, regarding the understanding of reality, which was substantiated by Kant, 
it should be noted that the phenomenal world formed by the transcendental subject be-
comes reality for him: “Nature… is the totality of all objects of experience” [25, p. 113]. 
The process of constructing the world is associated with transcendental conditions of 
sensation, a priori forms of reasoning and ideas of reason. As a result of this, the reality 
acquires an objectivist status, since it becomes an “imprint” of the architectonics of pure 
reasoning, which has an important nature. Science also receives justification, which in this 
case turns out to be an explicit form of a priori structures of reasoning. Kant writes: “In all 
appearances sensation, and the real which corresponds to it in the object (realitas phaeno-
menon)” [24, p. 271]. Reality is given to us through our sensation, it is sensation that fills 
our concepts, without which they would remain empty: “Only possible experience can 
communicate reality with our concepts; without this, any concept is only an idea, devoid 
of truth and relation to the object” [24, p. 526]. Space and time here act as transcendental 
conditions of sensation, setting the boundaries of the whole experience. Experience itself 
becomes possible due to the a priori forms of reason.
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For example, causal relationships found in the external world have a source for the 
category of reason (in this case, causality as a category of relationship), according to which 
the phenomenal world is constituted. The concept of the world is possible only as a conse-
quence of the ideas of pure reasoning. Accordingly, the laws of nature are based on a priori 
conditions of experience. Considering which, as noted by Huebner: “For Kant, physics 
is the only possible way of truly constructing an object” [26, p. 35]. Science (physics) re-
ceives the ultimate justification, since it corresponds to the a priori forms of reasoning: the 
principles of physics are the principles of reasoning itself. Consequently, natural-scientific 
knowledge is a true knowledge of the external world, because it is carried out on the basis 
of the principles of the mind itself, which has designed this world. Thus, the phenomenal 
world acquires the status of reality, moreover, the only reality about the existence of which 
a meaningful, consistent judgment is possible, and science, as the most adequate way of 
cognizing it, acquires an apodictic meaning.
Thus, in the philosophy of Kant, the phenomenal world becomes an exhaustive real-
ity for a person, which at the same time is constituted in an act of cognitive ability, access 
to the noumenal world turns out to be closed for him: reality is given within the limits of 
only reason, while reason constructs a phenomenal, one-dimensional world. It should be 
noted that in Kantian philosophy, God becomes a function of moral consciousness and 
immanent reality takes on an almost complete form. We can say that Georg Hegel com-
pleted this process of detranscendentalization of reality, reducing the fullness of existence 
to the self-development of the Spirit in History. 
The conducted analysis allows us to make the following conclusions. Firstly, it should 
be noted that the integral image of the world, which we today call the reality (the totality of 
all that exists) is a historical construct, which is characteristic only for the age of modernity. 
Secondly, the presence of a genetic connection between the world in this way, the scientific 
reason that created it, and Christian theology and even doctrines, outside of which they 
could not appear, can be emphasized. Thirdly, it can be stated that new ontological concepts 
receive the ultimate philosophical justification in German classical philosophy, the result of 
which is the world turning into a detranscendentalized one-dimensional reality.
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Предметом статьи является процесс формирования представлений о мире как реаль-
ности, который точнее всего описывается словом «изобретение». Автором с  опорой 
на классические в этом отношении тексты (Э. Гуссерль, М. Хайдеггер) и современные 
исследования (А. Макушинский, Ж.-Ф. Куртин) обосновывается позиция, согласно ко-
торой идея реальности не является культурным инвариантом. Мысль о том, что реаль-
ность существовала всегда, а благодаря научному разуму оказалась наиболее адекватно 
отражена, понята и описана, является существенной модернизацией. Об этом свиде-
тельствует как этимология концептов «реальность» и «действительность», впервые по-
явившихся лишь в схоластике (Д. Скот, М. Экхарт), так и процесс их содержательного 
наполнения, который неразрывно связан со становлением научной рациональности. 
В статье показано, что как научный разум, так и созданный им интегральный образ 
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мира, который мы называем реальностью, генетически восходят к  христианскому 
ценностно-смысловому универсуму. Изначально именно в рамках дискурса естествен-
ной теологии был концептуализирован образ автономного мира, развивающийся по 
универсальным принципам, установленным Богом. В  первых научных программах 
(Р. Декарт, Г. Галилей, И. Ньютон) эти представления получили свое продолжение, в ре-
зультате чего мир стал пониматься как имманентная реальность, подчиненная законам 
природы. Предельное философское обоснование новые онтологические убеждения 
получили в философии И. Канта, для которого феноменальный мир исчерпывает до-
ступную человеку реальность. Соответственно, мир превращается в одномерную де-
трансцендентализированную реальность. Такой методологический подход позволяет 
автору прийти к следующим выводам: 1) образ мира «реальность» является достаточно 
современным «изобретением», неизвестным предыдущим эпохам; 2) при этом он ге-
нетически связан с христианским смысловым универсумом, вне которого не мог бы 
появиться; 3) мир в нем понимается как одномерная имманентная реальность.
Ключевые слова: реальность, действительность, мир, научный разум, христианство, 
естественная теология, модерн.
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